Image Credits: The Myth of Self-Interest: New Philosophical Study Challenges One of Ethics’ Most Influential Ideas. AI-generated illustration created by Open Chronicle using ChatGPT (OpenAI). August 2026. This image is illustrative and does not depict a real-world scene.
By Open Chronicle with agencies
For centuries, the concept of self-interest has been regarded as one of the foundations of moral philosophy, economics and political theory. From debates about human motivation to discussions of public policy and free markets, the assumption that individuals possess a distinct sphere of “self-interest” has shaped modern thinking about ethics and rational decision-making.
A new study published by Cambridge University Press argues that this assumption deserves far closer scrutiny. In “The Myth of Self-Interest,” philosopher Kieran Setiya contends that self-interest, as it is commonly understood in modern moral philosophy, may not be a genuine ethical concept at all. Instead, he argues that it emerged from a historical misunderstanding that has influenced philosophical debate for centuries.
A challenge to modern moral philosophy
The paper builds upon ideas first raised by philosophers including Bernard Williams and G. E. M. Anscombe, both of whom argued that understanding ethics requires examining the historical development of moral concepts rather than assuming they have always existed in their current form.
Setiya extends this historical approach by focusing on one of philosophy’s most familiar concepts: self-interest.
Rather than accepting it as a timeless feature of ethical reasoning, he argues that philosophers should ask a more fundamental question: does self-interest actually describe a meaningful category of practical reason, or is it a product of historical confusion?
Aristotle’s missing concept
A central claim of the study is that Aristotle did not possess a concept equivalent to the modern idea of self-interest.
Instead, Aristotle’s ethics revolved around eudaimonia, often translated as human flourishing or the good life. For Aristotle, the question was not whether an action served one’s personal interests as opposed to moral obligations. Rather, the issue was whether a way of living contributed to a life that was genuinely worth choosing.
According to Setiya, Aristotle did not divide practical reasons into “self-interested” and “moral” categories. That distinction, now taken for granted in much contemporary philosophy, simply was not part of his ethical framework.
From flourishing to self-interest
The study argues that the modern concept of self-interest emerged much later, particularly during the early modern period through the writings of thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.
These philosophers increasingly connected human motivation with pleasure, desire and individual satisfaction. Critics of their views rejected purely subjective accounts of well-being but, according to Setiya, continued to assume that such theories must nevertheless describe some legitimate aspect of human life.
The result was the creation of an independent category called self-interest, distinct from morality but still treated as an essential source of practical reasons.
The paper argues that this conceptual shift fundamentally changed the direction of Western ethical thought.
Is the conflict between morality and self-interest real?
Modern ethics often presents individuals with an apparent dilemma: should people act according to moral principles or pursue their own interests?
Setiya questions whether this conflict is genuine.
If self-interest lacks a coherent philosophical foundation, then the familiar debate between morality and self-interest may itself be based on a mistaken assumption. Rather than asking whether moral actions conflict with personal interests, the study suggests philosophers should ask a different question: what makes a human life genuinely worth living?
Human flourishing takes centre stage
Instead of focusing on competing categories of moral and self-interested reasons, the paper returns to the ancient concept of human flourishing.
Drawing on Aristotle as well as contemporary neo-Aristotelian philosophy, Setiya argues that ethical reflection should concentrate on understanding the conditions that enable people to live well, rather than attempting to balance morality against a separate category of self-interest.
This perspective shifts attention toward virtue, practical wisdom, relationships, community and the broader meaning of human flourishing.
Implications beyond philosophy
Although highly theoretical, the study has implications far beyond academic ethics.
Ideas about self-interest influence economics, public policy, political theory, behavioural science and artificial intelligence. Many contemporary models assume that rational individuals naturally pursue their own interests, an assumption that underpins countless economic and social theories.
If the concept itself is less coherent than traditionally believed, the paper suggests that scholars may need to rethink some of the assumptions underlying these disciplines.
Reopening one of philosophy’s oldest debates
Rather than providing a definitive answer, The Myth of Self-Interest invites readers to reconsider one of the central assumptions of modern philosophy.
By tracing the historical evolution of ethical concepts from Aristotle through the Enlightenment to the present day, the paper argues that some of the most familiar questions in moral philosophy may rest upon categories that deserve renewed critical examination.
Whether or not philosophers ultimately accept Setiya’s conclusions, the study represents a significant contribution to contemporary debates about ethics, human flourishing and the foundations of practical reason.
References
- Setiya, K. (2026). The Myth of Self-Interest. Cambridge University Press.
- Bernard Williams, Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline (2000).
- G. E. M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy (1958).
- Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics.